DAVID F. CAVERS, CHAMPION OF LAWRELATED SOCIAL RESEARCH
MAURICE ROSENBERG*

My first impressions on becoming acquainted with David F. Cavers were of
a gentle, unassuming person who spoke softly, listened intently, analyzed
skillfully, and responded thoughtfully. In the thirty years of friendship that
followed I had no reason to revise my assessment, merely to amplify it.
Cavers was an immeasurably talented lawyer, a profoundly thoughtful scholar,
and a man with a preference for principle. His range of law-related interests
was practically unlimited, yet somehow he was able to attend to them
faithfully. In 1973 I found myself writing to him:
Prodigious, thy name is Cavers. I can never quite prepare myself for the depth,
breadth and volume of ideas that march in such orderly ranks from the end of your
pencil-on any subject you put your mind to.'

My closest professional and personal contacts with him centered on our
shared devotion to the mysteries of choice of law and to what he called "nontraditional research." His insightful writing on choice of law, starting with his
path-breaking article in 19332 and crowned by his Cooley Lectures at the
University of Michigan Law School in 1964,3 have made contributions second
to none in the field. Some years ago I put it this way:
Professor Cavers has come to understand the policies that underlie the choice-of-law
process in many areas of law. From that understanding he has shaped a number of
preference principles-rules of broad sweep and sensitive flexibility-and has thereby
provided
the key to making court adjudication unnecessary in a large number of
4
cases.

His invention of a way to avoid protracted litigation over which state's rule
applies is a legacy of great value to those who cherish justice. Without some
such rules as his, the parties often must dispute lengthily and expensively
before finding out which rule is applicable; Cavers' "principles of preference"
are far better than the open-ended approaches they would supplant.
However, it is to the second of our shared interests-non-traditional legal
research-that I want to devote these pages.
In the spring of 1983 Professor Cavers read in the Boston Globe that
President Derek Bok of Harvard University had devoted his .1981-82
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President's Report to "the state of law, the legal profession, legal education,
and legal research." 5 Unlike most of his law school brethren, Cavers found
himself surprised and "greatly stirred" 6 by Bok's ideas: "I can't think of any
comparable Philippic from such a source since the early days of President
Hutchins at Chicago .... ,,7 He went on to explain that his excitement was
generated by the feeling that President Bok had endorsed, albeit unwittingly,
the raison d'etre of the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law and its
successor, the Council on Law-Related Studies.8 Cavers had been president
of both entities, as will appear below.
Cavers' deep interest in non-library research was quickened by an
experience in the mid-1940's. At a faculty dinner a noted Harvard social
scientist nonplussed him by asking, "Why don't you and your colleagues do
research?" With visions of law reviews, treatises, Restatements, and other
works parading through his mind, Cavers protested that, of course, law
teachers did research. This prompted the social scientist to remark: "I don't
know any of you who have been gathering data." Cavers brooded about that
exchange, eventually concluding that there are, indeed, facts in the form of
data outside the West reports that would be profitable to gather.
For me, it was immensely reassuring to learn in my early days as a law
teacher that however eccentric my taste for law-related empirical research
might be, David Cavers, a brilliant and highly-respected legal scholar, was
likewise an aficionado. His steadfast devotion to law-in-action research was
nourished by a conviction he shared with Bok that research is a key element
"in any effort to redirect and revitalize the American legal system." He also
believed that "law schools had made surprisingly little effort to seek the
knowledge that the legal system requires. Even the most rudimentary facts
about the legal system are unknown or misunderstood." 9
The creation of the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law in 1957
gave him a fifteen-year-long opportunity to spur law schools and law
professors to greater efforts to do research and gather data outside the law
books. Under a testamentary bequest of the man for whom the Meyer
Institute was named, securities ultimately worth several million dollars were
set aside to create a "Research Institute of Law" with an ambitious mission:
It shall be the purpose of the . . . corporation through investigation, research and
stud) and through the publication of the results of such investigation, research, and
study to throw light on matters which will be of aid in securing to humanity a greater
degree of justice whether through the law as administered by the courts, through
legislation, through government local, national or international, or through a better
understanding only of human relations."t
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Cavers served as the president of the Institute and of its successor, the
Council on Law-Related Studies, throughout the years they existed. He
worked tirelessly to shape these organizations' grant-making policy in a
manner that would attract law professors to undertake non-traditional
research to discover facts essential for law improvement.
His own words in the biennial reports he wrote as president of the
Institute convey his views and values regarding law-in-action research. He
was less interested in the technical improvement of the law than in the
advancement of justice. Early in the Institute's life he conceived that a
comprehensive study of the state of legal research in major fields would
provide a valuable baseline. He persuaded the Meyer trustees to fund a threeyear study of American legal research. This was the first in-depth inquiry into
the objectives, methods, and products of American legal scholarship. He
hoped the results of the study might stimulate discussion in law schools on the
state of research endeavors and might suggest fruitful lines of further
research.''
The Institute's efforts to stimulate law-related empirical research met with
only moderate success quantitatively. Cavers was disappointed in the
response of American law teachers to the opportunities that the Institute had
created. 12 It was particularly important from his perspective that law teachers
not cede responsibility for law-related empirical research to the social
scientists. Rather, legal scholars ought to learn how to apply evolving
methods of social scientific research:
If we in the law are to move ahead in the new directions that have begun to beckon, we
shall have to develop a greater awareness of our own limitations as investigators. Even
though we do not accept all the limitations which, in the name of science, many
behavioral scientists impose on their inquiries, we must recognize that they have
acquired much valid experience and useful know-how from which we can benefit
13

By 1968 he had come to the conclusion that task-force research rather than
individual research offered the best chance of making progress on exploring
law in action:
[O]ur observation [has been] that, where several studies were directed to a single
problem area, in such fashion as to assure some cumulation in their contributions to
its understanding, the impact of the research findings was significantly enhanced. The
most striking example of the values derived from multiple studies in a single area is
that provided by the studies directed to the automobile accident problem described in
the Director's Report and, with some exceptions, brought together in the Institutesponsored volume, Dollars, Delay and the Automobile Victim [.- Studies in Reparationfor
Highway Injuries and Related Court Problems(1968)]14

Disappointed in the sluggish rate of growth of significant empirical
research activity by legal scholars, Cavers and the other Meyer trustees
decided on a change of direction. In 1968 they determined to prepare the
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way for the creation of task forces of highly qualified scholars who would work
in areas where well-targeted, carefully designed research was likely to "aid in
securing to humanity a greater degree of justice,"' 5 thereby advancing the
Institute's goals. A new entity, the Council on Law-Related Studies
("CLRS"), roughly patterned on the Social Science Research Council, was
created to carry forward the Institute's work. The Council's board of trustees
numbered sixteen members of whom seven were law professors and four were
social scientists, thus giving representation to more than twice as many
universities as the Meyer board, with its four law professors. Professor Cavers
became the Council's president when it was launched in 1969.
It was obvious that the Council's capital resources would last only a few
years under any reasonable grant-giving program. Cavers' prolific mind
produced a plan for a follow-on body that he hoped would continue to
stimulate and encourage non-traditional legal research by law teachers after
the money was gone. The new entity, to be called the Office for Law-Related
Research ("OLRR"), would be linked to the Association of American Law
Schools. By ingenious lawyering and skillful diplomacy, Cavers managed to
overcome formidable tax obstacles and to obtain the assent of the four
funding or operating institutions concerned with OLRR's creation.
Nevertheless, OLRR could not be activated because there was no qualified law
teacher who was prepared to direct the operation. In the end, the OLRR plan
was scuttled.
Looking back at the efforts of CLRS to perpetuate the faith in nontraditional research about law, Cavers commented: "The instruction
16
provided by experience is not always welcome, but it can be illuminating."'
It was typical of his resilient character and upbeat approach to life to find
illumination in a disappointed hope. It was my good fortune that he shared
such enlightenment with me. During the years when I was the Meyer
Institute's executive director,i 7 he often phoned late in the evening. The
length of these chats must have gladdened the heart of Ma Bell. Years later,
after an extended hiatus in these long-distance conversations, he phoned
again one Sunday evening. We found much to discuss. His follow-up letter
was typically wry: "It was like old times to be shortening your night's sleep by
long long-distance."'
David F. Cavers was a brilliant legal scholar and lawyer who had a vision of
affording greater justice to humanity by research that ventured beyond the
law books. His vision survives, not yet realized, but certainly closer at hand
for his work. Of him could be said what the late Carl McGowan wrote of his
departed friend and colleague, Harold Leventhal:
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His labors in the legal vineyard continue as reminders that the strongly flowing
mind can and do
springs of reason in the liberally endowed and highly trained human
19
create the climate in which justice flourishes and civility prevails.
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